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ABSTRACT  
 
Across most developed nations, including Canada, parallel systems of 
social welfare and employment insurance have increasingly been replaced by 
programs that emphasize work as a means to achieve welfare goals within the 
so-called re-employment framework. Various authors have drawn attention to 
the tension between the goal of long-term sustainable employment, and re-
employment-based strategies that emphasize short-term and stand-alone 
interventions. In this paper, we focus on the implementation of one such 
program in Canada, the Targeted Wage Subsidy. This program seeks to place the 
most marginal qualifying participants in employment by offering employers a 
financial inducement. By paying close attention to the experiences of those 
tasked with monitoring and implementing the program in Toronto, we identify 
various ways in which program design elements may systematically 
disadvantage the intended recipients. These program delivery mechanisms are 
shaped both in the practices of implementing agents, as well as by the public 
accountability framework that enforces rigid timelines and reporting 
requirements, resulting in a practice commonly referred to by employment 
service providers as “creaming.” Our observations lead us to question whether 
the target population is, in fact, the one benefiting from these return-to-work 
supports. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the early 1990s, Canadian labour market policies have been 
guided by the concept of re-employment. This concept favors active 
or direct interventions that promote job-readiness and rapid 
workforce re-entry strategies over approaches that focus on labour demand or 
S
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long-term education and training interventions to address unemployment (Peck 
and Theodore, 2000; Buchanan and Klassen, 2005). The design and 
implementation of re-employment-based programs in Canada has occurred 
within the context of a broader policy environment that, since early 2000, has 
been guided by an accountability regime born from the new public management 
system (see Phillips and Levasseur 2004; MacNeil, 2005). Government 
departments, in particular Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 
(HRSDC)1, have relied on such management mechanisms to ensure financial 
accountability in program delivery. We argue that when the new accountability 
regime is folded into the re-employment model, foundational tensions between 
policy objectives and program outcomes are amplified.  
We explore these tensions through a close examination of the Targeted 
Wage Subsidy Program (TWS) implementation in Toronto. The TWS is one of the 
five HSRDC Employment Benefits and Support Measures programs accessible 
through Employment Insurance for workers that have paid into this social 
security program and thus qualify for these benefits. This group of interventions 
is designed to provide training, education, and/or employment opportunities to 
unemployed workers with the goal of reintegrating them back into the workforce 
via the shortest route available.2   
When targeted programs are evaluated on narrowly quantitative 
measures of success, the result is often creaming. This is the selection (for 
program benefits) of those who are more likely to succeed over those candidates 
who are less qualified and hence, presumably, who are more in need. Creaming 
takes on particular significance in relation to the stated objectives of the TWS, 
because this is the only re-employment-based program that has a mandate 
directed toward those individuals identified as having multiple barriers to 
employment. 
Several authors have drawn attention to the problem of creaming in the 
delivery of government programs (see Lipsky, 1980; Stone, 1993). In Canada, 
Torjman (2000) has referred to the problem of creaming in HSRDC programs, 
and our research interviews confirmed a widespread belief amongst program 
officials and service providers that creaming does occur. Our research adds to 
the discussion of the disconnection between policy and implementation, by 
presenting qualitative evidence of creaming in a particular geographical region 
and policy context. Through a careful examination of the TWS program, we have 
isolated the specific mechanisms or pathways by which creaming occurs. 
The findings reported here are drawn from in-depth interviews 
conducted by the lead author during the second half of 2005. We show that these 
program delivery mechanisms are shaped both in the practices of implementing 
agents, as well as by the public accountability framework that enforces rigid 
timelines and reporting requirements. This leads us to question whether the 
target population is, in fact, the one benefiting from this return-to-work support 
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that is so favoured in the re-employment framework. 
While the economic and policy context has changed significantly since 
this research was conducted, we argue that our analysis is timely. The transfer in 
funding and program accountability for the Employment Benefits and Supports 
Program from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada to the Ontario 
Ministry of Training Colleges and Universities, and MTCU’s ongoing 
transformation process – under the banner of Employment Ontario – has created 
an important window of opportunity for policy reflection and adjustment.  This 
task is all the more urgent in light of the tough economic conditions, and the 
demands on government for economic stimulus and livelihood support. This is 
precisely the right time to re-examine program design and delivery in the light of 
our research findings. 
Re-employment   Through  Canada’s Targeted Wage  Subsidy Program 
The concept of re-employment has emerged as a guiding ideology of 
contemporary labour market policy in the developed world since the 1990s, and 
was the cornerstone of workfare models in both the U.S.A. and Canada (Peck 
and Theodore 2000; Etherington and Jones, 2004; Fletcher, 2004). We use the term 
re-employment to describe a framework that combines ‘narrow’ (see McQuaid 
and Lindsay, 2005) interventions on both supply- and demand-sides of the 
labour market, without embracing fundamental change in either. Re-
employment interventions are limited on the demand-side in the sense that 
instead of creating new demand for workers, “demand-led programmes locate 
employers that have a demand for new employees and then train the 
unemployed specifically for the available openings” (Fletcher, 2004: 115). On the 
supply-side, re-employment approaches may be regarded as an extension of 
“supply-side fundamentalism” which “[locates] the causes of (and therefore the 
remedies to) unemployment on the supply-side of the labour market” (Peck and 
Theodore, 2000; 729). This approach is narrow in the sense that it ignores 
personal circumstances and external conditions, focusing instead “upon 
‘employability skills and attributes’, often resulting in purely supply-side 
‘employability’ policies” (McQuaid and Jones, 2005: 214). Re-employment seeks 
rapid labour market re-entry for unemployed workers, offers assistance that is 
consciously minimal in an effort to avoid creating dependency, and is typically 
confined to job-preparation and employment search assistance (Etherington and 
Jones, 2004). 
Critics argue that such re-employment-based strategies have, to this 
point, paid relatively little attention to fundamental change on the demand-side 
such as changing the number, quality or durability of job opportunities, while on 
the supply-side, these short-term interventions do little to create more 
productive and skilled workers (Corak, 1993; Peck and Theodore, 2000; Fletcher, 
2004). The weaknesses of the re-employment concept are amplified by the fact 
that, in practice, intended beneficiaries are not necessarily the first to be chosen 
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for assistance.3 As designed, re-employment interventions are intended for 
people who have the weakest attachment to the labour force. Often, these are 
individuals who face “a broad array of barriers to work” (McQuaid and Lindsay, 
2005: 201), ranging from low levels of education and few market-appropriate 
skills, to cultural, language and disability barriers, and systemic discrimination 
in hiring practices.  
The current re-employment-based programs in Canada were launched on 
July 1, 1996; with progression from the Unemployment Insurance Act (of 1940) to 
the Employment Insurance Act (of 1996), the emphasis was now on active re-
employment strategies, not simply a passive system of income maintenance 
(Audas and Murrell, 2001). These active employment strategies are collectively 
termed Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSM). The Targeted 
Wage Subsidy (TWS) is one of these interventions, funded by HRSDC and 
delivered by local service providers, which are public, private, or non-profit 
delivery agents that are contracted to deliver government-sponsored 
employment programs to the community. In Toronto, the Service Providers 
offering TWS at the time the study was conducted were comprised of both public 
(a school board), and non-profit organizations. Service Providers delivering 
employment programs are further divided into two categories: assessment 
centres and job developers. Assessment centres conduct client intake, while job 
developers match program participants to local employers. Their responsibilities 
in this employment supports framework are detailed in Figure 1: Pathways to 
Creaming (see the end of the article). 
   
THE TWS AS AN ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET INTERVENTION 
 
Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWS) are an active labour market intervention 
used by governments in several advanced industrial democracies to increase the 
long-term employment prospects of workers by subsidizing on-the-job training 
with local employers. Katz (1996) argues that “Targeted Wage Subsidies are 
often motivated by desires to affect the composition of employment and aim 
program benefits at specific groups of workers whose employment opportunities 
are viewed as particularly in need of improvement” (5). In the case of the TWS in 
the Canadian Employment Insurance system, this specific group of workers is a 
sub-set of the general EI population, defined as having multiple and/or 
significant barriers to employment. 
The employment program (that an EI claimant gets directed into) is 
decided at the assessment phase. During a one-on-one 20 minute needs 
assessment with an employment counsellor, clients are interviewed to determine 
which of the five EBSM interventions best suit their employment needs. If they 
are identified (or have self-identified) as having multiple and/or significant 
barriers to employment they meet the eligibility criteria for Targeted Wage 
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Subsidy and may be directed to this intervention. From assessment at one agency 
they are then sent to a job developer at an unrelated agency. The job developer is 
charged with securing appropriate employment for this client within a three 
month timeframe. If the client cannot be placed with a local employer inside that 
three month window they are sent back to the assessor for re-evaluation to be 
placed into another intervention. This cycle will continue until they have 
exhausted all EBSM options or their benefits have expired. 
Subsidized placement in appropriate employment can be beneficial to an 
individual work-seeker. Green and Riddell (1991) suggest that wage subsidies 
can, over the long-term, create productive employees for those ‘targeted’ by this 
intervention: “What a subsidy can do is to buy time to accommodate change, so 
that subsidized employees can gain a niche in the labour market and adapt to 
changing labour market conditions. Therefore, in the long-run, the “effect of a 
wage subsidy is to improve the productivity, employment prospects, and wages 
of the targeted groups” (6). There is a general consensus among policy makers 
and critics of the program alike that the wage subsidy program is intended for 
those with the weakest attachment to the labour market, and that it is expected to 
lead to long-term sustainable employment. However, the question remains, are 
those for whom the program is intended the ones securing long-term 
employment? 
 
‘CREAMING’ AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY REGIME 
 
In Canada, tensions inherent in the re-employment model have been 
amplified by a new and highly restrictive accountability regime. According to 
Phillips and Levasseur (2004), the demand for accountability significantly 
affected the funding arrangements for employment programs: “In terms of 
accountability, Canada … imposed very stringent approval and reporting 
requirements on contributions and contracts after the crisis in Human Resources 
Development Canada in 2000” (452). As noted by one Service Provider: “The 
placement requirement is high on new clients with a limited staff….HRSDC is 
putting increasingly higher quantitative demands on the agencies doing it.” A 
major concern of this new accountability regime is that it exasperates the 
contradiction between the policy goals of increased long-term employment for 
target groups and actual, measured, program outcomes. 
Financial accountability in the TWS translates into counting job 
placements. Attention to the quality of jobs secured, and to the targeting of 
individuals on the basis of policy criteria, suffers. Service providers are required 
to meet job placement quotas or risk non-renewal of their contracts by HRSDC. 
In this environment, project officers morph into “police, pressured from above to 
ensure that rules are followed … and [are] necessarily being pre-occupied with 
financial reporting rather than with program impacts” (Phillips and Levasseur: 
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2004: 461). Under these conditions creaming can occur: “(w)ith the pressure to 
produce good results or risk being dropped service providers are engaging in 
creaming (serving mainly those clients highly likely to succeed), cover-ups, and 
similar organizational misdeeds [that] come to be regarded as essential to agency 
survival” (Stone: 1993: 591). Commenting on the Canadian situation, Torjman 
(2000) asserts that delivery agents “are under pressure to short-change 
participants and/or select only those most likely to succeed” (17). To ensure their 
dollars get reimbursed, agencies that deliver the Targeted Wage Subsidy 
Program choose the most job-ready for placement or those arguably without 
multiple and/or significant barriers to employment.  
 
RESEARCHING THE ISSUES 
 
In the absence of quantitative data on program participation and 
outcomes, in this research we sought to understand the ways in which creaming 
could potentially occur as a result of program design. In-depth interviews with 
TWS program stakeholders in a single place, Toronto, were chosen as the 
primary research method. To encourage participation, interviews were not tape-
recorded but hand-written interview notes were transcribed after each interview; 
this allowed for a fresh review of the interview. The transcribed notes were then 
sent back to the study participants to capture their reactions and to correct any 
inaccuracies in note-taking (see Patton, 2002). No study participants withdrew 
their consent as a result of being asked to review interview notes.  
One important reason for the qualitative approach to this research is that 
HRSDC policies - and especially the Targeted Wage Subsidy and related 
programs - are in constant flux, in part to address acknowledged program flaws. 
The richness of first-hand perspectives in a context of policy change became very 
clear to us when HRSDC’s Call for Proposals (CFP) became the main point of 
interest for all service provider respondents4. The controversy surrounding the 
CFP process did make some respondents wary, but once reassured, it provided a 
useful entry-point for the interviews, providing a deeper understanding of the 
role of program intentions, design, implementation and monitoring mechanisms, 
as well as the larger policy framework in which they are set. 
The findings from HRSDC and Service Provider respondents are 
discussed below; findings drawn from interviews with employers are not 
reported here, although they did inform our analysis. HRSDC is comprised of 
three levels: National Headquarters (NH), Regional Headquarters (RH), and 
Human Resources Centres of Canada (HRCC). An interview was conducted with 
an official at each level of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. 
National Headquarters (NH) is responsible for policy design of the TWS 
program; RH for program implementation regionally; and HRCC for ensuring 
project-specific processes follow program guidelines. The focus of these 
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interviews was on understanding how federal program design and monitoring 
translated into project delivery in the community. Every Service Provider 
providing either assessment or job development for the TWS funded through EI 
was contacted. All but two of the six Toronto agencies agreed to be interviewed. 
In addition, all current service providers holding contracts with HRSDC in 2005 
were interviewed.  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: PATHWAYS TO CREAMING 
 
Interviews with HRSDC and Service Providers revealed a surprisingly 
strong consensus that the gaps between program objectives and implementation 
processes, in conjunction with financial accountability mechanisms, do indeed 
result in the practice of creaming. In Figure 1 (placed at the end of the article) we 
depict the steps through which an individual EI recipient proceeds from initial 
acceptance for one of the five ESBMs, to placement with an employer in a TWS 
position. We have identified three pathways in the delivery of the TWS by which 
creaming, the selection of better qualified candidates, may occur. In Figure 1, and 
in the text that follows, we refer to these “pathways to creaming” as PW#1, 
PW#2 and PW#3: 
PW#1: Qualifying EI recipients visit an assessment center which 
determines whether “TWS is the best intervention.” An action plan is completed. 
This determination, and thus the client’s eligibility to access TWS, is based on the 
center’s identification of barriers. Potential for creaming exists here because 
barriers are based on subjective criteria determined by the individual service 
provider. Once identified, these barriers are documented and client is sent to a 
separate SP agency to see a “Job Developer”.  
PW#2: The job developer may engage in creaming. We distinguish 
between integrated service providers, with a diverse funding stream and some 
ability to combine and change interventions if the assessment proves 
inappropriate or subsequently requires modification, and single service 
providers that rely on a single funder without the ability to vary the 
interventions. In the single-service approach, the decisions concerning which 
clients to assist are in danger of being determined more by an employer’s 
requests and the funder’s financial target requirements than the client’s needs, 
resulting in creaming. Creaming may also occur with a service provider that 
offers an integrated approach to program delivery. When one program is not 
suitable for the client, (as may happen with TWS assessments), then the client 
may be directed into another program at the agency, potentially resulting in 
creaming. 
PW#3: Employer calls or is called by an employment agency; employer 
provides a list of requirements they are looking for in the right candidate. 
Creaming occurs to the extent that employers shape or influence how the job 
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developer selects candidates to meet employer-defined job needs. The job 
developer sends what they regard as appropriate clients to employer, who makes 
final decision on hiring and so the employer may also engage in creaming. 
It is our contention that these pathways to creaming are a result of the 
practices of implementing agencies and the strict accountability requirements 
that exacerbate the foundational contradictions of the re-employment 
framework. In coming to this conclusion, we have arranged interview responses 
in three analytical themes: the Selection Process, Performance Indicators, and 
Program Abuse.  
 
SELECTION PROCESS 
 
Program goals and project timelines collide at the intake phase, especially 
for job developers. According to one Service Provider: “The fear of putting in 
unpaid hours and giving money to employers in wage subsidy costs that may 
not be recouped if employment is secured outside the three month window can 
result in service providers betting on the sure thing and picking participants they 
are confident they can find work for within three months.” This source of PW#1 
and PW#2 creaming was to be eliminated by a new delivery mechanism 
(introduced by HRSDC in 2005) that no longer allowed the same service provider 
to engage in both selecting and actually placing the participant in employment. 
Yet, the new delivery mechanism met considerable resistance from service 
providers because HRSDC simultaneously increased placement rates for job 
developers who no longer had control over the selection process, without 
relaxing the 3-month placement timeframe. According to a Service Provider who 
secured a contract in 2005 under the new delivery mechanism, “80% [of clients 
assessed as having multiple barriers to employment] will have to be placed into 
subsidized positions.” The new, higher target means that service providers will 
likely still engage in creaming: “We have to be fussy about who we take into the 
program. Of course, they still have to have two significant barriers but now they 
have to be highly marketable.” Arguably thus, the new targets that were 
introduced in 2005 created the incentive for more PW#2 creaming, directly 
affecting how effective the program becomes in serving those with multiple 
barriers to employment. 
In addition to the selection of service providers, the mutable concept of 
‘multiple and/or significant barriers to employment’ as the foundational criteria 
for participant selection remains an underlying source of PW#1 creaming. In fact, 
one Service Provider commented that in the absence of any clear parameters 
regarding barriers, creaming is not only likely, it is inevitable: “The very issue of 
barriers as a criteria feeds into the practice of creaming and is further magnified 
by the unobtainable targets set by HRSDC for program success.” In the presence 
of financial measures of success, those unemployed individuals who present 
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with the fewest barriers are chosen first. For this reason, what qualifies as a 
barrier was an issue of much debate. HRSDC National Headquarters explained 
the barrier criteria from a policy perspective: “TWS is the only one of five EBSMs 
that is targeted, but by program design it is intended this way – to assist those 
with barriers.” However, according to one job developer, barriers are the ‘wild 
west’ of employment supports.  
Perhaps the reason the ‘barriers’ criteria resemble the Wild West is 
because no one group is accountable for setting the parameters. National 
Headquarters hands the responsibility off to Regional Headquarters (RH): “We 
leave the specific definition of barriers to employment up to the regional and 
local offices to have flexibility to meet local needs.” RH likewise defers to HRCC 
“We don’t impose a uniform approach … I can’t tell the tools to you, but we look 
at the clients they [SP] help and compare this against the type of clients we want 
them to serve.” In turn, HRCC leaves the act of defining barriers up to the 
Service Providers. So, who exactly are the clients HRSDC want service providers 
to assist? The “genuinely barriered” was the answer from RH; though what 
makes one genuinely barriered remains open to interpretation.  
The struggle over the concept of ‘barriers’ actually signals the central 
paradox of the re-employment model. How can a client be deemed too barriered 
to find work on his/her own, yet still present as job-ready?  According to one 
assessment centre, “there is barriered, and then there is barriered and then there 
is more barriered.” Another job developer explained the crux of the paradox 
thus: “They must be too barriered to find their own job, yet not barriered enough 
that they can’t find employment within three months!” Herein lies the tension 
between programmatic targets and realities of the client population mandated 
for service. While the program is intended to serve those with multiple and/or 
significant barriers to employment, Service Providers (and indeed many HRSDC 
officials) acknowledge that those are the very individuals often excluded from 
placements.  
 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
HRSDC headquarters readily described the two key performance 
indicators used to measure the program’s overall success as financial. They are 1) 
percentage of participants returning to work three months after the end of the 
intervention and 2) savings on unpaid benefits. National Headquarters described 
these as “crude indicators” for evaluating program success: “This measurement 
is a dollar-driven factor. We would like to be more results-oriented… but 
currently we are focused on two outcomes.” Focusing on these two indicators to 
the exclusion of others that might examine long-term job quality or participant 
satisfaction also allows the practice of creaming to take hold. Reinforcing the 
notion that what is measured is important, the NH respondent noted that any 
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record keeping on activity at the community level was all anecdotal and hence 
suspect in their opinion. 
Financially-based performance indicators at the federal program level 
result in an even more narrow focus on finances and timeframes within the 
regional and local offices. The success of service providers is measured by the 
clients referred for job placement (for the assessor). Both the assessment centre 
and the job developer are measured by the number of clients that have been 
successfully placed in employment. HRCC respondents claimed that the 70% 
target for successful placement is ‘conservative’ (in the sense of being too low), 
and that if assessments are accurate, the job developer should be able to place an 
even higher percentage without having to cream:  
 
They should be able to place 80% of those referred to them by assessment 
because all the referrals should be suitable for the intervention referred. And this 
percentage is based on the numbers in their proposals. If they are doing this then 
there shouldn’t be any creaming. If the assessment centre says that this is the 
appropriate intervention then in theory they should be able to place 100% of the 
referrals (HRCC respondent). 
 
One of the largest Toronto service providers not to have their contract 
renewed in 2005 argued that they lost out because their proposed placement rate, 
based on previous experience, “came in below [HRSDC’s] target on our estimates 
of clients we would be able to serve.” According to the same SP, HRSDC was 
expecting an unrealistically high placement percentage that no Service Provider 
could accomplish and still serve the more barriered. However, one of the 
“winning” Service Provider was likewise displeased with the imposed new 
targets: “(w)e won the contracts, but HRSDC ignored everything we submitted. 
Basically it was a redesign of the proposal…. Changed in budget, forecast, 
procedures, policies, and staffing.” In order to meet the new requirements, the 
service provider with the newly awarded contract(s) stated that they would have 
to be “more involved in the filtering process to meet the new targets.” What this 
new filtering mechanism implies is that creaming will continue to occur unless 
targets are brought more in line with program philosophies. According to the 
same provider, “this high placement rate is rubbish. It may look good to the 
Canadian taxpayer, but it is unachievable.”  
In a climate in which unspent funding is frowned upon5 “some [service 
providers] will turn people away because they will not be able to place them 
within three months and they need to ensure they can get paid”; this is a 
potential source of PW#2 creaming. Conversely, PW#3 creaming may occur as 
the job developer seeks to increase placement rates. According to a former 
Service Provider, job-readiness takes on a new meaning in this context. In an 
environment where the percentage of clients expected to be served exceeds 
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realistic goals, “job-ready means you have a realistic chance of getting them into 
subsidized employment within three months.” What is the danger of defining 
job-ready in this way? In the words of a former Service Provider, “Clients with 
the most barriers, those who need training or a series of intensive interventions 
just bounce back from assessment center to job developers trying to find one that 
will take them. Sometimes they will find a survival job, or they will move to 
social assistance where they have an easier time accessing training and other 
services.”6 
Both assessment centres and job developers are equally anxious to meet 
placement targets and while both engage in the practice of creaming, both also 
blame the other for resorting to this action. A former service provider 
commented: “Assessment Centers need to enter some kind of action plan into the 
NESS (National Employment Services Systems) database to justify their 
existence, so they refer many of these clients to TWS. But many providers bound 
by performance guidelines that require employment within twelve weeks are 
reluctant to accept anyone unlikely to be successful.” Others indicate that both 
assessment centres and job developers resent that they share some of the same 
targets –i.e. the percentage of intakes that need to be employed three months 
after the end of the subsidy. At least one assessor interviewed commented on 
resenting being evaluated on employment placements when they do not control 
the job matches. Their targets are very much a measure of “how good the job 
developer is, their circle of contacts, and their relationship with employers.” 
However, HRSDC acknowledges that both parties need to work together to 
achieve success: “The assessment center suffers if they don’t give a good referral, 
so it is in the assessment centers and that of the job developer’s mutual interest to 
work together.” Acknowledging that Assessment Centers and Job Developers 
need to work in collaboration reinforces the significance of the creaming 
pathways earlier identified. It becomes apparent then that PW1 and PW2 fuel 
each other and increase, not decrease the likelihood that creaming occurs within 
the current system of program design.  
In perhaps a more subtle way, employers are also engaged in creaming 
(PW#3). While they are not directly responsible for the delivery approach 
established within the TWS program, their needs drive the demand for the TWS 
program, and thus for the type of client served by this intervention. Recalling 
Fletcher (2004), “[using] hiring requirements of employers as a basic standard of 
job readiness, such interventions may legitimate discriminatory behaviour which 
is a cause of the inequalities that some groups face in the labour market” (115). 
The potential for creaming at pathway 3 becomes increasingly possible when 
rigid placement timeframes is factored into current labour market realities. 
According to one respondent, “The employment rate is not high and this flips the 
challenge of finding work. It is an employer’s market right now.” 
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PROGRAM ABUSE 
 
Our interviews revealed an important divergence between the attitudes 
of HRSDC staff and service providers on the role of program abuse in creaming. 
One reason for the atmosphere of strict accountability for program dollars is the 
belief that program abuse exists and is widespread (Torjman, 2000; Fletcher, 
2004). All our respondents understood creaming as a predictable by-product of 
current program implementation processes. But, for service providers, this meant 
that strict accountability was part of the problem. One Service Provider stated 
that “(d)ue to eligibility requirements and rigid timelines this program has the 
potential to lead to creaming.” However, not all HRSDC respondents accepted 
that excessive concern about abuse contributes to the problem of creaming. 
Instead, HSRDC staff engaged in two discourses. First, they generally argued 
that creaming was not abuse (we would agree), and second they argued that 
further tightening up of the accountability framework could help eliminate 
creaming (we would not agree). 
An HRSDC official in the national office addressed the concern of 
creaming thus: “If I can put words in your mouth, are you asking if individuals 
are being creamed?” Without waiting for a response they continued, “You are 
probably on the right track. There are lots of clients served that have more 
education than you would expect. Look at the 2003 summary report.”7 Likewise, 
one HRCC respondent dismissed creaming as merely a little “coloring outside 
the lines”, while the regional headquarters staff respondents claimed that if 
creaming does happen, it is not a significant problem: “I can’t say that it is not 
happening. But there are enough checks in place that the practice is not 
widespread.” 
Yet, in their follow-up comments, the RH staff revealed great sensitivity 
that creaming may be conflated with abuse. After noting that creaming was not 
widespread, they continued to note that the “policy people” at NH “understood 
that there is a potential for creaming, a possibility that you can ‘feed yourself’ so 
they separated job development from assessment.”8 Likewise, the NH 
respondent also revealed that they were seeking to limit creaming within the 
confines of strict reporting and performance requirements:  
 
We are struggling with this (creaming) issue. We are asking ourselves how best 
do we select or target individuals to participate in our programs? The question 
we have to ask then is if you have an accountability framework in play that has 
performance indicators what objectives are you trying to change? 
 
Our data gathered from all study participants suggests that creaming is 
nurtured in an environment when the tools that are used measure the wrong 
thing. The indicators of success being measured lead service providers anxious to 
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meet targets to select only those most likely to succeed, not necessarily those for 
whom the program was designed. While performance indicators are the most 
visible explanation for creaming, the larger context of re-employment provides 
fertile ground for its development. 
 
TARGETED WAGE SUBSIDIES – AN EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION? 
 
The narrow strategy of re-employment that guides labour market policy, 
program design, and program implementation is incongruent with an 
overarching goal of ensuring long-term sustainable employment. When the 
current accountability measures are folded into this model of employment 
delivery, system flaws are amplified. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
Targeted Wage Subsidy Program. The in-depth interviews shared here 
emphasize the incongruence between current measurement tools and broader 
program objectives. Creaming throws into question the ability of these programs 
to accomplish long-term sustainable employment for the targeted group. 
An alternative to the financially-based success measurement system 
would be a participant-centered measurement of program effectiveness. Yet no 
such data are collected in Ontario in a way that can influence the day-to-day 
practices and decisions that create program outcomes. Instead, participant 
perspectives are limited to what amount to customer service satisfaction surveys. 
HRSDC acknowledges the value of client feedback in improving the program’s 
effectiveness, and promises to publish some participant data in future in the form 
of Summative Evaluations. In the meanwhile, ‘evaluation’ in the form of financial 
performance indicators continues having a decisive impact on program 
outcomes. 
Performance indicators for the TWS program are not in line with 
program philosophies. This is a fact that study respondents readily 
acknowledged. The intake and placement timeframes are too restrictive to 
accommodate those with more significant barriers. Strict adherence to a limited 
set of indicators contributes to creaming and, ultimately, the inability of the 
program to meet the needs of the clients targeted for assistance. A former Service 
Provider offers this suggestion for improving the current system delivery: 
“[extend the intervention from] three months to one year or at least to the end of 
a person’s EI claim.” Pushing out timelines would, they argue, result in serving 
the target group mandated for service. 
When financial targets serve to exclude from assistance unemployed 
workers who are supposedly within the program’s target population, new 
measures or, at the very least, additional measures of success should be 
established to guide which interventions are delivered to participants. Instead, 
dogmatic adherence to a policy of rapid re-employment - which seems to have 
become entrenched in current policy thinking - is making it impossible for policy 
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makers to conceive of a new and adaptable model of employment that would 
allow long-term sustainable outcomes.  As argued by Hum and Simpson (1999) 
and Fletcher (2004), it is possible and indeed necessary for policy makers to 
combine supply-side policies with demand-based agendas to address the 
problems that are created when short-term strategies are used to effect long-term 
employment goals. Addressing the policy climate that allowed these tensions to 
flourish may do much to address the especially negative consequences for the 
most marginal workers of the short-term, low-pay job churning that has 
characterized Canada’s labour market over the last decade (Cranford, Vosko and 
Zukewich, 2003). 
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Job Developer seeks suitable employment placement for client 
PW#2 
Integrated Model 
Job developer may choose from a range 
of possible interventions 
Single Service Provider 
Job developer tries to place the client in 
employment. 
Creaming – clients with greater needs 
may be diverted to alternative programs 
if the SP feels that there is a better 
program to meet their needs; clients with 
less significant barrier(s) to employment 
may be diverted into TWS if SP feels this 
is the best intervention. 
Creaming – clients with fewer needs are 
more likely to be placed in employment 
as providers strive to meet targets set by 
HRSDC. 
HRSDC Regional and Local Headquarters 
Allow SPs to define their own eligibility criteria with regards to employment barriers. Lack of a 
consistent framework leaves open the possibility for creaming. 
Client 
(Individuals that have contributed into EI are eligible for one of five ESBMs) 
Assessment Center determines eligibility within ESBMs 
PW#1 
Service providers determine whether “TWS is the best intervention”, complete an action plan, 
and send client to separate SP agency to see a “job developer”. Creaming may occur with this 
determination, since it is based on the subjective identification of ‘barriers’ by the individual 
provider. 
Employer 
PW#3 
Creaming may occur when employer shapes selection criteria: employer calls or is called by job 
developer, and employer providers a list of requirements they are looking for in the right 
candidate. 
Creaming may occur since employer makes final hiring decision and may choose those with the 
least barriers: the job developer interviews the assessment center’s pre-screened client; they pass 
along appropriate client; employer interviews client. 
Figure 1: 
Hypothetical pathways to creaming in the 
Community Coordinator Model Wage Subsidy Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 13 – Spring 2009 
 
NOTES 
                                                          
1  Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Social Development Canada were re-merged 
in February 2006; their new name is Human Resources and Social Development Canada and is meant 
to reflect “integrated policy development, as well as improved delivery of programs and services 
through Service Canada” (see Service Canada,  
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/about/reports/sir/section1.shtml, last accessed 1 March 
2009).  
2  In January 2007, these programs were transferred to the Ministry of Training Colleges and 
Universities under the 2005 Canada-Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement.  It is too early 
to determine what effect this will have on program design and delivery, but our hope in writing this 
paper is that the MTCU will address the shortcomings we have identified. Employment Ontario’s 
transformation process is not expected to be completed until June 2010, with new service contracts 
rolling out in phases beginning in April 2009. 
3  We are concerned here with mis-selection of intended program beneficiaries. Another significant 
concern in Canada that has already received attention in the literature is the fact that only 39% of job-
seekers qualify for Employment Insurance programs (Gagnon, 2004: 23; Maxwell, 2004: 7). The non-
qualifiers include new labour market entrants, especially youth, new Canadians, and other first-time 
job-seekers. According to a more recent report (MISWAA, May 2006), only 29% of the unemployed 
(and only 22% of the unemployed in Toronto) are eligible to access EI and therefore benefit from Part 
II programs, Employment Benefits 
4  In an effort to create a more transparent and accountable system of awarding contracts to Service 
Providers, HRSDC implemented the new approach to funding in February 2004. 
5  Government officials refer to unspent funds as “slippage”, which is reclaimed at the end of each fiscal 
year. Service providers understand this as a disciplining mechanism, since unspent allocations may 
jeopardize future allocations. Several used the colloquial phrase “spend it or slip it” to describe this 
operating environment. 
6  The majority of Service Providers claimed these targets (and other program policies) affect program 
effectiveness, but one respondent did challenge this view. This Service Provider employee, although 
concerned about the gaps in client service that resulted from the “back and forth” of contract 
negotiations said that they were “very fond of the program.” They believed that the targets “were all 
obtainable goals.” This can, perhaps be explained by their comment: “The goals are all different for 
different Service Providers.” Despite HRSDC and other Service Providers’ claims that targets are 
similar across the board, perhaps this Service Provider had lower targets to meet. However, the most 
likely explanation is revealed by the respondent’s admission that “I don’t know what the goals are for 
the current contract.” The study participant interviewed was not directly involved with the new 
(2005) contracts. 
7    To access the 2003 Monitoring and Assessment Report visit 
 http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/HS1-2-2003E.pdf, last accessed 1 March 2009. 
8    Recall that this separation was initiated with the 2005 CFP process. 
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